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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of regulatory reform on the performance of Spanish savings banks.  To this
end it uses panel data for the period 1986-1995 and a flexible variable profit function that incorporates time-
varying technical efficiency. The focus is whether increased competition brought on by deregulation
affected performance of banks over time. Bank performance, measured by the percentage change in
profitability, ceteris paribus, is decomposed into technical change and change in technical efficiency both of
which are defined in terms of the profit function. We also examine output technical efficiency, which is
defined in terms of the production possibility frontier. Several alternative models with different
specifications of technical efficiency are used to check robustness of the results. Empirical results show
declining levels of output technical efficiency along with a significantly high rate of technical progress. In
spite of declining technical efficiency during this period, we find evidence of an increasing trend in
productivity growth.
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21. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the banking sectors of many industrialized countries have been subjected to
various forms of deregulation.  Apparently, the policy makers believe that improving the efficiency and
performance of financial systems is better implemented through deregulatory policies aiming at increasing
bank competition on price, product, services, and territorial rivalry (Smith, 1997). However the empirical
evidence on the impact of such initiatives has been mixed.
Berger and Humphrey (1997) state that the consequences of the deregulation may essentially depend
on industry conditions prior to deregulation process as well as on the type of deregulation measures
implemented. The deregulation on the asset side of the balance sheet that has focused on the liberalization of
the volume and the interest rates of bank lending have resulted in improvement of both efficiency and
productivity of Norwegian banks (Berg, Forsund, and Jansen, 1992). Similarly, the Turkish banks had the
same experience (Zaim, 1995).  However, the impact of liberalization on Indian banks has resulted in varied
productivity efficiency depending on the different type of ownership (Bhattacharyya, Lovell and Sahay,
1997).
On the contrary, the deregulation measures pertaining to the deposit rates competition have not
changed efficiency levels in the U.S. banking industry (Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey 1993; Elsiani and
Mehdian, 1995).  In fact, U.S. banks have experienced decline in productivity growth (Humphrey, 1993;
Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). In Korea however, it was the privatization of the banking industry rather than
its interest rate deregulation on deposits that has resulted in increased output and productivity (Gilbert and
Wilson, 1998).  In Japan, the collapse of its bubble economy led to a rather stable technical efficiency level
over time, however the productivity growth and efficiency change differed across banks and organization
forms (Fukuyama, 1995).  With regards to geographical deregulation and consolidation in the U.S., Hughes,
Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996) have reported efficiency to increase with additional operation thus
confirming the benefits from geographical expansion.1  Recently, Wheelock and Wilson (1999) reported
declining efficiency and productivity of U.S. banks, especially small banks, during the 1984 and 1993
period.  However, the paper did not explicitly focus on the impact of deregulatory changes during the
sample period.
In Spain, a number of studies have focused on the performance of banks during the deregulatory
period.2  Although a variety of specific findings emerged from these studies, two features stand out. First,
the evidence indicates a limited change in productivity and an increase in inefficiency in both commercial
and savings bank sectors. Second, the decline of performance was relatively less for the savings banks that
                                       
1 For an extensive review of literature on the bank performance and efficiency due to consolidation and related issues
see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999).
3were subjected to more deregulatory measures in recent years.3 Th se findings might be due to the fact that
banks have had a difficult time adjusting to the increased freedom and competition created by deregulation.
Despite their stated intentions to investigate the bank performance during the deregulation era in
Spain, most studies tended to focus on measuring the level of efficiency and/or productivity growth over
time without linking them to the deregulatory process.   In fact, these papers focused more on the use of
frontier technique instead of explaining the deregulatory process.  Although, Grifell and Lovell (1996)
attempted to undertake such explanation their study specifically concentrated on analyzing productivity
change. Overall, the above studies have either estimated the efficiency and productivity growth measures
from a cost-minimizing framework or have used a non-parametric technique designed to obtain results on
technical inefficiency of inputs. However, the recent literature has established4 the uperiority of profit
efficiency over the cost efficiency measures for evaluating the overall performance of banks.
In this study, we employ a short-run profit function to investigate the effect of deregulation on the
performance of Spanish savings banks. We concentrate on savings banks because many of the deregulatory
initiatives were specifically designed for this sector of the industry since commercial banks had already been
benefiting from similar deregulatory measures for years.  Moreover, in recent years, the savings banks have
shown aggressive gain in market shares relative to other banking institutions.
Unlike other studies, the present study uses a longer time horizon and a state-of-the-art econometric
approach to examine the effect of the deregulation process on productivity growth, technical change, and
efficiency.  It considers a model that is based on the profit maximizing behavior and measures both technical
inefficiency and profit loss therefrom for each bank and for every year.5  We allow technical efficiency to
vary through time in order to examine whether the deregulatory measures enhanced profitability and
efficiency of savings banks over time. Finally, it measures productivity growth, which is then decomposed
into change in technical efficiency and technical change. Such a separation of technical inefficiency from
technical change is important because it allows one to decompose productivity change into technical change
(a shift in the profit frontier over time) and change in technical efficiency (a movement toward the frontier).6
Instead of using the traditional cost-minimizing framework, this is the only study - except for Berger and
Mester (1999) – that investigates the productivity growth in a profit-maximizing framework. Overall, our
                                                                                                                               
2 For example, see Grifell and Lovell (1996, 1997) and Lozano-Vivas (1997, 1998) and the references cited in there for
papers dealing with deregulatory initiatives during the mid 1980s.
3 One explanation to these results could be that the savings banks sample is more homogeneous than that of the
commercial banks sample.
4 For example, see Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger and Mester
(1999).
5 Previous studies using a profit function approach focused on profit inefficiency alone because it was believed that
estimation of both technical inefficiency and profit loss therefrom cannot be achieved unless the underlying production
technology is quite restrictive (self-dual), see Kumbhakar (1996).
4evidence reveals a high level of technical inefficiency along with a very high rate of technical progress.
Despite increased technical inefficiency during the sample period we see evidence of productivity growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the Spanish banking
system and recent deregulatory initiatives. The model is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 describes the
data. The estimation method is discussed in Section 5 and empirical results are presented in Section 6. The
final section contains a summary of our findings and conclusions.
2. SPANISH BANKS AND DEREGULATION INITIATIVES
The Spanish banking system consists of commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives.
The first two sectors contain over 95% of the banking assets.  Since the recent wave of deregulation,
primarily during the 1985-1990 period, savings banks have been more successful in gaining market share at
the expense of the private commercial banks.  This new emergence of saving banks in the deposit market as
well as in the loan market has diminished the traditional dominance of private commercial banks in the
Spanish banking industry.7
After a series of small initiatives undertaken in the late 1960s, deregulation efforts were intensified
during the mid-1980s.  The primary reason for this rapid liberalization process was to keep the competitive
edge of the local banking and financial markets at par with other European countries after the removal of
barriers to inter-country competition in financial services within the European Economic Community.  Over
the years, the focus of deregulation in Spain have been to eliminate interest rate controls and investment
requirements, to relax reserve requirements, to promote branch expansion and to ease entry of foreign banks
in the local markets.
Equal investment requirements established for commercial and savings banks in 1985 were
gradually phased out during 1989-1992. Reserve requirements were lowered in 1992 and entry restrictions
for foreign financial institutions started in 1986.  All interest rates and commissions were deregulated in
1987 and credit ceilings were lifted by 1990.  While branching of commercial banks was freely allowed in
1985, restrictions on savings banks remained in effect until 1989.8  Overall, in the past two decades, the
Spanish banking industry has gone from a strongly regulated oligopolistic system to a new environment
where the banks can compete through prices or quality of services, with very little regulatory and entry
restrictions on institutions and markets.
                                                                                                                               
6 It is not always possible to separate the two effects without making distributional assumptions on technical
inefficiency (Kumbhakar (1990)).
7  For more details on changes in market structures and relative market share and strategies undertaken by the two
sectors, see Canals (1997) and Hasan, Hunter, and Lozano-Vivas (1999).
5While commercial banks were traditionally oriented towards corporate business, savings banks
primarily served retail customers.  Most of these savings bank customers held low average balances and
valued convenience and proximity of branch offices.  After the regulatory reform process began, the
commercial and savings banks followed different strategies in adapting to the new financial market.
Commercial banks focused more on adjusting their deposit and loan rates to meet increased competition.  In
contrast, savings banks pursued a growth strategy by expanding branch and ATM network and undertaking
a series of mergers.
The deregulatory measures altered the competitive structure of the banking market causing tangible
changes in savings banks' income statement and balance sheet during the sample years.  Table 1 depicts
statistics of a number of bank- and market-specific variables that are pertinent to our analyses.  For brevity,
the table reports information on certain sample years and the averages before and after 1990 to provide a
general view of the industry experience during the deregulatory and post deregulatory periods.9 Among the
significant observations during this period was the fall in the financial margin, from 4.9% over assets in
1986 to 3.8% in 1995.  In fact, during the 1991-1993 period, the average margin was even lower at 3.5% in
1991 and 2.9% in 1993.  This drop in financial margin was basically due to increasing interest cost for
deposits caused by the enhanced competition in the market. Banks attempted to adjust to the new
environment by extending, among others, non-depository banking activities thus increasing earning from
service fees and related businesses.  In fact, earnings from service fee increased from a 0.28% over assets in
1986 to 0.56% in 1995.  This evidence of changes in earning patterns reflects a structural change in the
banking industry and market rivalry.
Relaxation of branching restrictions accelerated saving banks’ desire to take a more prominent role
in the banking market. They pursued a growth strategy by expanding branch network and undertaking a
series of mergers. This has prompted a 17% increase in number of branches during the sample period and
contributed to a 38% decline in the number of savings banks. There was a phenomenal increase in the
number of ATMs per bank (from 40 in 1986 to 301 in 1995, i.e., a 652% increase). During this time period,
the savings banks also decided to initiate an increase in price competition that was facilitated by an earlier
deregulation in interest rate.10  Overall, the net effect has been a substantial increase in the market share of
the savings banks.  Their market share for deposits was 45.3% in 1995 compared to a 40.1% in 1986.  The
progressive liberalization of the savings banks' activities has also brought a change of their product mix,
e.g., the loan to deposit ratio increased by 37%. These banks successfully expanded their market share in
                                                                                                                               
8 For an extensive overview of the liberalization process, see Vives (1990, 1991a, 1991b); and Hasan, Hunter, and
Lozano-Vivas (1999).
9 The 1986-1990 indicates a time period when most of the deregulatory initiaves were undertaken whereas 1991-1995
period represent post deregulatory period.  Statistics for each of the sample years are available upon request.
6both deposit and loan markets capturing the later at a relatively faster rate implying certain qualitative
differences in their product mix.
 In order to have a better insight on the impact of deregulatory changes and developments on
productivity, efficiency, and technical change we go beyond these sample statistics11 nd develop a variable
profit function model.  This profit function approach controls for variations in prices (inputs and outputs)
and other quasi-fixed inputs/output attributes while examining efficiency, productivity growth, and technical
change.   The following section briefly describes the variable profit function with technical inefficiency.
3. THE MODEL
Let y = (y1, ..., yM) be a vector of M outputs produced by the banks using x = (x1, ..., xJ), a vector of J
variables inputs, and z = (z1, ..., zQ), a vector of Q quasi-fixed inputs and/or output characteristics. We write the
production technology (better known as the production possibility frontier) as F(yeu, x, z, t = 0, where y is the
observed output vector, t is time (in years), and u ³ 0 is output technical inefficiency.  Output technical
efficiency is measured by (e-u). By technical (in)efficiency we mean output technical (in)efficiency throughout
our analysis.
Since we assume that the objective of banks is to maximize variable profit both variable inputs and
outputs are decision variables. Consequently, optimum levels of variable inputs used and outputs produced will
depend on the level of technical inefficiency. The optimization problem for a bank can be formally written as
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where p = (p1, ..., pM)' is the vector of output prices and w = (w1, ..., wJ)' is the variable input price vector.
The solution of the above problem gives the following form of the efficiency adjusted variable profit
paeu, viz.,
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where ym and fj are solutions of ymeu and xj obtained from (1).
                                                                                                                               
10 See Fuentsalz (1994) for details on the simultaneous strategy of aggressive branch expansion and price competition
during that period.
11 Descriptive statistics do not control for covariates and hence comparing mean values of variables before and after
deregulation might give misleading results.
7Since p (weu, p, z, t) is homogeneous of degree one in weu and p, we express the above relationship in
(2a) as
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and ),,~,ˆ(ˆ tzpwp  is the normalized variable profit function. Note that the variable profit function and the
normalized variable profit function are denoted by p(weu, p, z, t) and ),,~,ˆ(ˆ tzpwp , respectively. We rewrite
(3) to express normalized actual profit as
.),,~,ˆ(ˆln~ln utzpwa -= pp (4)
For estimation purposes the formulation in (4) is complete when a parametric form of (.)ˆlnp  is assumed. We
assume a translog from for ),,~,ˆ(ˆln tzpwp , i.e.,
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with the following symmetry restrictions, aik = aki, bml = blm, dqr = drq.
Rewrite (5) as
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from which we can calculate profit technical inefficiency, lnpu(.), defined as potential profit loss due to
technical inefficiency as
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It can seen from (7) that profit technical inefficiency, lnpu depends on variable input and output prices,
quasi-fixed factors, and time, unless the production technology is homogeneous. Equation (7) also provides an
analytical solution relating output technical inefficiency (u) and profit loss therefrom (lnpu(.)).Thus, one can go
back and forth from production technical inefficiency to profit technical inefficiency. This result is not limited
to homogeneous production technologies. Now we examine the rate of change in variable profit over time
(labeled as the rate of productivity or overall productivity change), holding everything else constant (i.e.,
ta ¶¶ /~lnp = DOPt)12. Since (from (7))
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the rate of productivity change (DOPt) is decomposed into technical change )( tTCD  and profit technical
efficiency change )( tTED . Exogenous technical change (shift in the profit frontier 0(.)ˆ =up  over time, ceteris
paribus) is measured by tTCD  and change in technical efficiency (percent reduction in profit loss) is
represented by  tTED .
             Using the specification in (5) we get
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which measures the rate of change in variable profit without technical inefficiency.
 Similarly,
                                       
12 Note that productivity change here is defined differently from total factor productivity change which can be affected
by changes in prices (w and p) as well as the quasi-fixed factors/output attributes (z).
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Note that tTED  is not the same as change in output technical efficiency (¶
u- /¶t). It is possible for profit
technical efficiency to decrease even u incr ases because the former depends on prices and the z vari bles.
4. DATA
The data used in this study is taken from the annual publication "An ario de la Confederación de
Cajas de Ahorros".  Due to the increased mergers and acquisitions during the sample period (1986-1995)
there has been a marked reduction in the number of Spanish savings banks. Over this period, twenty mergers
and acquisitions took place: one in 1989, nine in 1990 (involving twelve banks), five in 1991 (involving
eight banks), two in 1992 (involving three banks), two in 1993, and one in 1995. Consequently, the total
number of savings banks declined from 75 in 1986 to 46 in 1995. We constructed an unbalanced panel data
by retaining pre-merger savings banks as separate banks and treating the merged ones as new banks.
In the definitions of inputs and outputs, we use a value-added approach (Berger and Humphrey
(1992). Following Humphrey and Pulley (1997), we take the view that banks provide two main categories of
financial services: (1) intermediation and loans services (measured by three asset categories, viz., home
loans, other loans, and interbank loans); and (2) payment, liquidity and safekeeping services (measured by a
liability category, viz., core deposits).  A change in accounting practice in 1992, however, forced us to
aggregate all loan categories – home loans, other loans, and interbank loans -- into a single measure of loans
enabling us to extend the present study through 1995.
Consequently, two output variables, viz., total loans and core deposits, are used. The three variable
inputs used in this study are labor (number of employees), variable physical capital (furniture, fixtures and
materials) and financial input (measured as cost of funds).  The quantities of outputs and inputs are the
averages of their balance sheet figures at the beginning and the end of the year. This averaging procedure is
used to reduce errors due to fluctuations or growth over the year.  Prices of outputs and variable inputs are
obtained by dividing revenues of each output, and expenses of each input, by their respective quantities.
10
In addition to the above output and input prices, some other quasi-fixed/control variables are also
used in the variable profit function.  We treat  physical capital (immovable assets) and financial capital 13 as
quasi-fixed inputs. Assets composed of securities and investments (labeled as other assets) are used as
control variables. This asset category accounts for significant differences in revenues among savings banks.
The number of bank offices (Branch) is viewed as a quality/attribute of outputs because an increase in bank
offices is likely to provide more convenience to the customers. Another output attribute/quality is the
number of automatic teller machines (ATM).
Given that the savings banks have gone through mergers, one can control for this effect either by
using a merger dummy variable, or using the time elapsed after the merger (age) as a control variable. The
latter is preferred because the productivity effect of a merger, if any, is likely to change over time after the
merger.
The dependent variable in our model is variable profit, calculated as revenues minus costs of
variable inputs.  We  impose linear homogeneity restrictions on the variable profit function by using wages
as numeriare. We also normalize all the variables by financial capital to control for heteroscedasticity
(Berger and Mester 1999). Finally, the 1986 prices are used as the base year and we adjust all relevant
variables (measured in value terms) using the consumer price index.
5. ESTIMATION
For estimation purpose the model outlined in (3) and (5) is extened to accommodate the revenue and
cost share equations. Using duality results, we get
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13 Hughes et al. (1995), Berger and Mester (1999), among others, argue for the inclusion of financial capital in profit
studies.
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which are used along with the normalized variable profit function in (3) and (5). Classical error terms are
added to each of these equations. These error terms are assumed to be distributed with zero mean and constant
variances and covariances over time. The system consisting of M+J equations is then estimated using
nonlinear iterative seemingly unrelated regression (ITSUR) techniques.
Several models with and without technical inefficiency are estimated. To conserve space, however, we
report results from the following models. Model 1 is the standard neo-classical variable profit function model
that ignores technical inefficiency completely. Model 2 considers technical inefficiency to be time-invariant.
Models 3 and 4 accommodate time-varying technical inefficiency. In Model 3 we specify uit as
)1( tbu tiit += m (13)
where mi is the bank-specific parameter, estimated from the coefficient of the dummy variable Di, which equ ls
one for bank i and zero for all other banks. The other parameter bt is common to all banks. Thus, the temporal
pattern of technical inefficiency is assumed to be the same for all banks. Letting bt v ry across banks would
substantially increase the number of parameters.14 Model 4 differs from Model 3 in the specification of
technical inefficiency. The form of inefficiency used in Model 4 is
)1( ATMBRbtbu atiit ++= m (14)
where ATMBR denotes number of ATMs per branch. The idea here is to make technical inefficiency
formulation more flexible and to test whether inclusion of output quality variable ATMBR affects technical
inefficiency. Thus, Model 4 is the most general  model, and Models 1-3 are nested in it.
In Model 2, technical inefficiency is estimated relative to the best bank in the sample (Schmidt and
Sickles, 1984), i.e.,
{ },ˆˆˆ i
i
ii maxu mm -= (15)
where imˆ  is the estimated coefficient of the bank dummy Di. When u is allowed to be time-varying (Models 3-
4), we estimate technical inefficiency relative to the best bank in each year, i.e.,
{ } ,,...,1,ˆˆˆ Ttmaxu it
i
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14 It is possible, in principle, to specify a much more flexible from of tehcnical inefficiency such as uit=b0t+b1tt+b2tt
2
(Cornwell et al. (1990)). Such a formulation, however, requires estimation of 3N parameters in uit alone. Thus, unless T
is very large, it is better to use some parsimonious specifications. We also tried some other forms of uit such as
uit=mi(1+btt+c age) and uit=mi(1+btt+c merge). Results from these models are quite similar to those obtained from the
specification in (13). These esults can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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where itmˆ  is the estimated value of uit obtained from (13) or (14). Once technical inefficiency is estimated,
potential output loss (percent) can be calculated from )1( ˆ -ue . Similarly, potential profit loss (percent) due
to technical inefficiency for each bank can be calculated either from (7), or from
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the estimate of which can be obtained from (7) by taking the exponential of the right hand side of (7) and
then subtracting unity from it. The above formula is used to calculate profit loss due to technical inefficiency
for each bank in every year. Although technical inefficiency is time-invariant, profit loss due to technical
inefficiency can change over time. This is because u interacts with w, y, z, and t variables.
6.  RESPONSES TO DEREGULATION
We now concentrate on the overall significance of the deregulatory initiatives on the performance of
saving institutions and its market condition in general. Since the deregulatory changes are scattered
primarily over the 1986-1990 period, as noted earlier we consider 1986-1990 as the deregulatory period and
1991-1995 as the post-deregulatory period. After specification testing among the four models discussed in
the preceding section, we report results in terms of output and profit efficiency, first, and then examine
technical change, change in efficiency, and overall productivity growth.
To examine the presence of output technical inefficiency we test the specification of Model 1
against Models 2-4, which include technical inefficiency in some forms. We reject Model 1 against Models
2-4 separately at the 5% level of significance. Then we test whether technical inefficiency is time-invariant
or not.  The time-invariant output technical inefficiency specification (Model 2) is nested in Models 3 and 4.
The standard t-test on the bt co fficient in Models 3 rejects Model 2 in favor of Model 3 at the 1% level of
significance. A positive value of bt indicates an increase in technical inefficiency over time, ceteris paribus.
Finally, Model 3 is nested in Model 4. The t-test on the coefficient of ATMBR in Model 4 is found to be
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Based on this 10% significance level, we consider
Model 4 to be the preferred model.15 Here we observe a positive relationship between technical inefficiency
and ATMs per branch.  Although the statistical significance of such relationship is marginal nevertheless it
gives us an important piece of information, viz., an increase in ATMs per branch tends to increase technical
inefficiency. Since increase in ATMs per branch reflects enhancement of output quality (not captured in the
                                       
15 However, if one considers the 10% significance level too high, then the best model is Model 3. Here we discuss
results from both the models.
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measured outputs) part of the deterioration of technical efficiency might be due to such output quality
enhancements.
Output Technical Inefficiency (u)  and Profit Loss (ln pu)
Output technical inefficiency (u) and profit losses therefrom (lnpu) are reported for Models 2, 3 and
4 in Table 2. The first three columns of Table 2 report the mean values (by year) of output technical
inefficiency (potential output losses) corresponding to Models 2-4 followed by the mean values of potential
profit losses. In Model 4, we find that (potential) output loss increased from 16.19% in 1986 to 27.64% in
1995, the mean being 20.76 %. The corresponding figures in Model 3 are 15.4% to 27.49% with a mean of
20.75%.16 Mean output losses due to technical inefficiency increased from 18.40% (in Model 4) during the
years of deregulation to 23.11% in the post-deregulatory years. The corresponding figures for Model 3 are
18.22% and 23.29%, respectively.
Entries in the last 3 columns of Table 2 portray the evidence of an increase in profit technical
inefficiency (i.e., loss in potential profit because of the inability to produce the maximum possible output
vector, ceteris paribus) from the beginning to the end of the sample period. However, the percentage of
profit losses in Model 3 and 4 declined from 25.17% (21.16%) in 1986 to 22.8% (20.06%) in 1990 and then
increased to 34.27% (32.42%) in 1995.17  Models 3 and 4 both predicted an increase in mean profit losses,
on average, from the deregulatory years to the post-deregulatory years (see the last two rows of Table 2).
This result is not surprising since the mean output losses increased during the post-deregulation years.
In order to check for robustness of these results, we re-estimated all the models using the alternative
profit function (Humphrey and Pulley (1997)) instead of the standard profit function used in the present
paper. The alternative profit function is identical to the standard profit function in (5) except that the output
vector, y, replaces the output price vector, p. Berger and Mester (1999) suggest that the alternative profit
may be helpful when (i) there are substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of banking services; (ii)
outputs are not completely variable; (iii) output markets are not perfectly competitive; and (iv) output prices
are not accurately measured. Th  results from the alternative profit function are reported in the appendix
(Table A.1). Potential output loss predicted by each model under the alternative profit function is somewhat
higher in magnitude compared to the corresponding model under standard profit function.  The same
conclusion is reached when potential profit losses are compared. These differences are, however, not
                                       
16  Within each model we find substantial variation in both technical inefficiency and profit losses among banks.
However, a high degree of correlation exists in the efficiency ranking of banks obtained from different models. The
correlation coefficients of (potential) output loss due to technical inefficiency across different models are: 0.90 (Models
2 and 3), 0.89 (Models 2and 4), and 0.99 (Models 3 and 4). That is, technical inefficiency of banks across models is
quite robust.
17  Note that (percent) profit loss depends on technical inefficiency as well as other variables that appear in the profit
function. Thus, it is possible for profit losses to decline even if technical inefficiency increases.
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significant. A pre- and post –deregulation comparison shows that output and profit losses increased during
the post-deregulatory years. This prediction is true for both Models 3 and 4. Again these results are similar
to those obtained from the standard profit function.
We find estimates of potential output and profit losses under both standard and alternative profit
models to be highly correlated. Rank correlation coefficients of potential output and profit losses between
these two models are 0.84 and 0.92, respectively. We also find a negative and statistically significant
correlation between efficiency and standard average cost ratio, and a positive and significant correlation
between efficiency and  profitability ratio. These findings are consistent with Berger and Mester (1999),
Humphrey and Pulley (1997), and suggest that our efficiency measures are quite robust and are not simply
the consequences of our specifications or methods.
Technical Change, Change in Profit Technical Efficiency, and Productivity Growth
Now we focus on the productivity change results which is the sum of technical change18  (sh fts in
the profit frontier through time, ceteris paribus) and change in profit technical efficiency components (see
equation (8)). These results for the standard profit function are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The
corresponding tables for the alternative profit functions are Tables A.2 and A.3.  Tables 3 and A.2 report
mean values of technical change per year across all banks for Models 1-4.  All the models show technical
progress (i.e., outward shift in the profit frontier) increases savings banks profits over time although the
progress slows down for some years.  These estimates from the alternative profit function are somewhat
smaller, but the difference is not significant. In all models under the alternative profit function, we also
observe a declining trend in technical change. Estimates of technical progress obtained from Models 3 and 4
are 5.14% and 5.08% in 1986; 4.43% and 4.27% in 1995 with a mean of 4.45% and 4.39% per year. These
estimates are somewhat higher but consistent with Grifell and Lovell (1997) who found technical progress at
the rate of 1.9% over the 1986-1993 period.19 The rate of technical progress, on average, during the post-
deregulation years is found to be somewhat smaller compared to its counterpart during the period of
deregulation. This is true for all the models in both standard and alternative profit functions (see the last two
rows of Table 3 and Table A.2).
In Tables 4, first, we report change in profit technical efficiency results and then the overall
productivity change. The same sequence is followed for the alternative profit functions in Table A.3. The
first three columns report changes in profit technical efficiency in Model 2-4 and the last four columns
report rates of overall productivity change. In Models 3 and 4 we find that the contribution of profit
                                       
18 Note that this definition of technical change is based on the profit function not the production possibility function.
19 The relatively higher mean technical progress in this study compared with Grifell and Lovell (1997) is not surprising
for several reasons. This paper uses a profit maximization framework, incorporates a large sample size, and use
different methodology and estimation technique, and different measures of inputs and outputs.
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technical efficiency to productivity growth is negative. The mean values of profit technical efficiency
change in Models 3 and 4 are –2.79% and –2.56%, respectively.  The corresponding figures obtained from
the alternative profit functions are –1.98% and –1.77%. We also find an improvement in profit efficiency
change after deregulation predicted by both the standard and alternative profit functions. In the standard
profit models the mean of profit efficiency change increased from –3.32% to –2.27% in Model 3 and –
3.01% to –2.12% in Model 4, whereas in the alternative profit models these numbers for Models 3 and 4 are
–2.15% to –1.81%, and –2.00% to –1.54%. Profit technical efficiency has improved over time in spite of
deterioration of output technical efficiency (see Table 2) because output technical efficiency as well as
prices and the z variable affect profit technical efficiency.
Because of the negative contributions of profit technical efficiency change, the overall productivity
changes in Models 3 and 4 are smaller than technical changes. In Model 3, the overall productivity change
increased from 1.44% (per year) during deregulatory years to 1.87% per year during the post-deregulatory
years.  The mean for the entire sample period is 1.66% per year.  The comparable statistics in Model 4 are
1.74% and 1.92% and the overall mean is 1.83%. These figures are somewhat higher in the alternative profit
function as can be seen from the last 2 rows of Table A.3.20
Our evidence above indicates that during the sample years the savings banks experienced high
levels of technical inefficiency along with a significantly high rate of technical progress.  These banks also
reported an increase in productivity growth.  Taking all accounts into consideration, it seems that despite the
adjusting efforts by the banks, the continuous deregulatory initiatives during the sample period prevented
banks from producing the maximum possible output vector while concerned with intense competition for
market share.  Some of these banks adjusted quickly to the new environment while others struggled to keep
pace to the best-practiced ones causing increased technical inefficiency.  Under these circumstances, the
evidence of average output losses is not unusual.  On the other hand, it seems that increased convenience
provided by branch expansion has been an effective competitive strategy since savings banks showed
technical progress every year.  The technical progress was however a bit slower during the 1991-1993
period when savings banks launched its branch expansion strategy while intensifying price competition.
These costly schemes prevented banks from immediate profits but positioned them well for an increasingly
higher market share in the banking business. Despite this apparent trade off, savings banks reported positive
productivity growth.21
                                       
20 Larger banks reported relatively higher productivity growth than their smaller counterparts.  This result holds for
both standard and alternative profit functions, and is consistent with Wheelock and Wilson (1999). Similarly, banks
with higher technical progress (ranked from highest to lowest technical progress)  show increasing profit efficiency and
productivity growth.
21 We also find inverse relationship between productivity growth and growth of loan to deposit ratio.  This could be due
to the fact that banks with rapid expansion in loan activities follow a less stringent lending criteria and thus exposed to
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study we use a flexible variable profit function to investigate the effect of deregulation on the
performance of Spanish savings banks during 1986-1995, the period during which the Spanish banking
industry went through major regulatory reforms. The paper uses a comprehensive statistical approach and
considers a profit function model that measures both technical inefficiency and profit loss. We also
decompose productivity change (the rate of change in variable profit) into technical change and change in
technical efficiency components.  We do so without making any distributional assumptions on technical
inefficiency and other statistical noise terms in the variable profit function and variable profit share
equations.  Several alternative models with different specifications of technical inefficiency are also used
and results from these models are compared.
The time varying output technical inefficiency models predict dete ioration in technical efficiency
over the time. Depending on the specification of output technical inefficiency, the overall mean of potential
output loss (output technical inefficiency) and profit loss therefrom (profit technical inefficiency) varied
from 19.79% to 20.76% and 25.28% to 30.91%, respectively. All the models predict a high rate of technical
progress. The overall mean technical progress (per year) ranged from 4.1% to 5.86%.22 Despite an increased
output technical inefficiency, we find evidence of positive productivity growth defined as the sum of profit
technical efficiency change and technical change.
The performance of the Spanish savings banks in the post-deregulatory environment is found to be
slightly better. The post deregulatory period showed a higher productivity growth rate (an average of 1.90%
during 1991-1995 compared to 1.15% during the 1986-1990 period). Finally, the new environment brought
by the deregulation and liberalization has prompted banking institutions into a more competitive industry.
The Spanish savings banks’ experience reveals that the aggressive interest rate competition and the
expansion strategy of branching network apparently have caused an initial decrease in profit efficiency.
However, these developments also positioned the industry to play a more dominant role in the depository
industry where savings banks show a positive productivity growth in their production process.
                                                                                                                               
higher credit risk resulting higher loan losses.  Such explanation is consistent with experiences in U.S. (Clair (1992))
and Finland (Solttila and Vihriala (1994)).
22 Estimates from the alternative profit function model also reveal similar results. The mean (potential) output and
profit losses were 23.94% to 26.20%, and 27.09% to 32.29%, respectively. Similarly, mean technical progress ranged
from 3.8% to 5.82%.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Spanish Saving Banks
Variables Years
1986 1991 1995 1986-1990 1991-1995
Financial margin 4.9% 3.5% 3.8% 5.0% 4.3%
Interest cost 5.4% 6.9% 7.2% 6.2% 6.9%
Fee income
to assets
0.28% 0.45% 0.56% 0.36% 0.51%
Number of  branches 12,831 14,031 15,029 13,485 14,619
Number of saving
Banks
75 53 46 72 48
Average ATM per
bank
40 185 301 74 246
Market share of
deposits
40.1% 44.1% 45.3% 41.3% 44.6%
Market share
of loans
30.4% 35.9% 39.5% 33.0% 37.9%
Loan to deposits 46.3% 60.4% 63.6% 52.1% 62.4%
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